Tag Archives: nonconscious

Quote for the Day – The Overwhelming Automaticity of Being

“Habit is thus a second nature, or rather, as the Duke of Wellington said, it is ‘ten times nature,’–at any rate as regards its importance in adult life; for the acquired habits of our training have by that time inhibited or strangled most of the natural impulsive tendencies which were originally there. Ninety-nine hundredths or, possibly, nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of our activity is purely automatic and habitual, from our rising in the morning to our lying down each night. Our dressing and undressing, our eating and drinking, our greetings and partings, our hat-raisings and giving way for ladies to precede, nay, even most of the forms of our common speech, are things of a type so fixed by repetition as almost to be classed as reflex actions. To each sort of impression we have an automatic, ready-made response. My very words to you now are an example of what I mean; for having already lectured upon habit and printed a chapter about it in a book, and read the latter when in print, I find my tongue inevitably falling into its old phrases and repeating almost literally what I said before.”

~William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology: and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals

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Thinking About the Libet Experiments (Again)

In a way, I hate thinking about how to properly interpret the famous Libet experiments on free will. For those who haven’t heard of them, the experiments are fairly simple. First, the brain is monitored in some way, usually with EEG. Then, the subject is asked to “consciously decide” to wag a finger. There are electrodes on the finger that can detect precisely when the finger moved. Moreover, when the subject “consciously decides” to wag their finger, they are instructed to look at a clock with a fast rotating hand. They are supposed to remember where the clock hand was when they felt like that had consciously decided to wag their finger.

What are the results? Well, the main thrust of the experiments is that Libet would see EEG activity that would reliably predict the movement of the finger before the subject reported even feeling to consciously decide to wag the finger. In other words, before the subject had “consciously decided”, some part of the brain was already active that reliably predicts finger-wagging. They can do this experiment now with more sophisticated techniques, and I think they can use brain activity some 10 seconds before the conscious decision to predict when the finger would wag. Pretty wild stuff, right?

Usually the Libet experiments are interpreted as showing that free will is an illusion and that consciousness is basically a mere side-effect of nonconscious processes. The idea is that the preconscious brain activity is in charge of really deciding to wag the finger. The “conscious decision” to wag the finger is a by-product or side-effect of this preconscious activity. So the idea then is that consciously deciding to do something and then feeling like it was that conscious decision which did the causal work is an illusion. Many theorists like Dan Wegner have thus concluded that consciousness is a retrospective illusion, with no causal efficacy.

Every time I think about the Libet experiments and all these interpretations about free will my head starts to hurt. Somehow it feels super fishy to me to conclude from the experiments that free will is an illusion. Of course, there is a sense in which the Libet experiments do prove the idea of free will to be false. If we thought that, whatever the will is, it can’t be physical or realized in the brain, then yes, the Libet experiments do seem to undermine this idea. Libet’s experiments conclusively show that the brain is a major player (if not the only player) in deciding what we do. If you are a physicalist like me, then this idea is pretty obvious. But I don’t think this immaterial spooky free will concept is really what’s at stake philosophically (although of course theists and dualists will disagree).

What’s at stake in my opinion is whether the Libet experiments call into question the conceptual distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions. Is there a fundamental difference between sneezing when I step into strong sunlight or on deciding to get married? Sneezing is usually understood as an automatic, involuntary reflex. Deciding to marry someone is a classic example of what we call a “voluntary action”. In my opinion, Libet’s experiments don’t call into question the basic legitimacy of this distinction. If even we lived in a perfectly deterministic world, it would still be right to distinguish in humans voluntary and involuntary behavior.

I think what the Libet experiments might show is that there is a neural realizer base for voluntary actions. No surprises there. But what about the idea that the “conscious decision” to wag a finger comes so late? It doesn’t seem to be quick enough to really call the shots for motor control. But I think this comes to the heart of the matter: is the “conscious decision” to wag a finger really the best example of when consciousness exercises control? Wagging a finger and deciding to get married are two radically different kinds of decisions. The first happens over the course of milliseconds, the second can happen over the course of months or years. In my own case, my decision to want to marry Katie was drawn out over a long time period. I really had to stop and reflect deeply about my future with Katie and whether I saw myself being happy with her 50 years in the future.

As a Jaynesian, I like to define consciousness to be a kind of introspective power, a power to reflect on the past, present, or future in ways that transcend the automatic and habitual tendencies of action shared by our animal cousins. Defined in this way, I’m not really sure the decision to wag a finger is really representative of the kind of action planning that consciousness is best suited for. Consciousness as I define it is not suited for millisecond control of finger motion. It’s more relevant for planning a wedding, or deciding to take that new job, or go on vacation. Consciousness as a action-controlling process is less a sensorimotor function as it is a narrotological function. Consciousness thinks in terms of stories. It is a long-term synthetic function. It operates on the longest time-scales in the brain. So finger wagging might just miss consciousness all together. So I’m not sure it’s best to conclude from the Libet experiments that consciousness is just an epiphenomena or mere side-effect that plays no causal role.

Don’t get me wrong though. There is a sense in which even the operations of a narratological consciousness are determinstic insofar as they are realized in brain tissue, and brain tissue of course follows physiological laws without deviation. So there is a sense in which even long-term, narratological conscious processes are “determined” by brain processes. If we could do a long-term Libet-style experiment on the causal precursors of my decision to get married, I’m sure we could find all sorts of precursors. But again, this is only surprising if we thought that the will must be immaterial and free-floating from physical processes. But the fact that consciousness is realized in the brain is no reason to think that sneezing is of the same action type as deciding to get married.  And of course there is whole host of intermediate action types between sneezing (a reflex, really) and getting married. There are certainly a lot of “higher” cognitive functions that are nonconscious, including powers of reasoning and perception. But I think it is crucial to the human sciences that we don’t collapse all these distinctions because of simple experiments like Libet’s. There is an important distinction to be made between voluntary and involuntary, between conscious and nonconscious. And consciousness is not just a synonym for awareness. As I use it, it’s meant to capture that process of reflection and deliberation characteristic of “big” decisions like deciding to get married or whether to take a job.

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Blindsight: A Case of Nonconscious Sensation

Blindsight is the curious neurological syndrome where someone is capable of “seeing” to a limited extent but claims to have no subjective experience of seeing. They could, for example, post cards into slits at the right orientation while verbally reporting they have no idea what the orientation is. Such patients have led cognitive scientists to talk about there being two different visual streams in the brain: the ventral “what” stream and the dorsal “where/how” stream. In blindsight patients, the hypothesis was that they had a functioning “where/how” stream but their “what” stream was damaged. The idea then was that only the “what” stream is conscious, and this explained why the blindsight patients lacked visual phenomenology.

But some philosophers have disputed the idea that the dorsal stream is nonconscious. These people have argued that just because someone can’t report or have access to phenomenology that doesn’t mean there is no phenomenology. So now there is a big debate about whether and to what extent the “where/how” stream is conscious.

In order to determine whether the “where/how” stream is conscious, we need to first define what we mean by consciousness. Most philosophers like to define it in terms of what-it-is-likeness, which is more or less synonymous with “awareness”. I like to define consciousness more precisely because the term “awareness” is one of the most vague and least helpful words in the vocabulary of philosophers. Does a moth have “awareness” of a light? Sure, but should we therefore think the moth is conscious? That doesn’t follow. I prefer to follow Julian Jaynes in defining consciousness narrowly as a kind of introspective power. To get an idea of what introspection means close your eyes and imagine yourself sitting in a chair 50 years in the future. Such mental time travel is one of the functions of what I am calling consciousness. It allows you to reflect on what you have done or might do. Its content is varied, ranging from visual, auditory, gustatory, haptic, emotional, bodily, and linguistic content. It allows you to have an inner monologue. On how I define it, consciousness is a kind of reflective/introspective/metacognitive/higher-order monitoring system that takes as its content other brain representations.

But if we thought this kind of reflective consciousness was the generator of “phenomenology” then we would have to think that a great deal of nonhuman animals had no phenomenology. This is a bad result, so we should not conflate reflective consciousness with what-it-is-likeness. Now, in the case of the blindsight patient, what should we say? On my account, we should say that the patients lack reflective consciousness but there is still something-it-is-like to have an operational “what/how” stream. Thus, we can distinguish nonconscious sensation from conscious sensation. The blindsight patients has nonconscious visual sensations in virtue of having an operational “what/how” stream that can accurately discriminate visual information so as to aid motor planning, but lacks “conscious visual sensations”. In virtue of being tied into higher-order monitoring systems that has access to linguistic contents and global workspaces, consciousness is responsible for reportability. So only conscious sensations can be reported on, explaining why the blindsight patients claim to have no visual experience. We can now clarify that they don’t lack nonconscious experience but conscious experience. Since conscious experience is by definition introspectable, we can now clarify the way in which their phenomenology is changed when blindsight sights lose the ability to introspect on their visual stream. So blindsight patients have nonconscious sensation, but lack conscious sensations, which are reportable by definition. They maintain the ability to respond intelligently to the world, but lack the ability to be metacognitively aware of what’s going on in their visual experience.

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