Consciousness, as a materialistic process, is the analysis and reaction to data about the world around us. All animals have some level of awareness. We hairless apes have the big brain to allow us many layers of meta analysis, some layers of which we are able to insert optional data to fill in the gaps. Somewhere in the continuum of analysis capabilities, between round worm and humans is where we see most animals. Some dogs seem smarter than others, why? Some humans are more aware than others, why?

Any hypothesis of the definition of consciousness should properly explain these differences… in my opinion. Priming would only have a useful effect if the individual already had the meta analysis tools to make advantage of it. This would require more advanced and in depth testing to show that it does or does not have an effect. Even with great effort, the measurable value of such priming would be difficult to acquire given that (per example above) we cannot know just what links an individual has between coins and charity, charitable acts, finding things in general etc. People who regularly give their coins to charities or who only give to charities by donating coins from their pockets might get primed by finding a dime. People who save pennies/coins for vacation money probably would not.

The tests, as I understand them, are designed wrong, are designed to fail.

Sure, there are many different competing ideas about consciousness. But how many of these are well-developed theories with supporting empirical evidence? For example, the retinoid theory of consciousness details a particular system of brain mechanisms with a neuronal structure and dynamics that represents a volumetric space including a “point” of perspectival origin (the theoretical locus of the core *self* — I!). The causal properties of the retinoid system have been tested and have successfully explained/predicted many previously inexplicable conscious phenomena. See, for example:
http://people.umass.edu/trehub/YCCOG828%20copy.pdf
and
http://theassc.org/documents/where_am_i_redux

What do you think are the two most important competing theories of consciousness?

Your statement captures my own sentiments perfectly, but I guess I draw a more skeptical conclusion than you. The inescapable theory-ladenness worries me from a philosophical and epistemic point of view, especially when there are thousands of contesting consciousness researchers, each with their own competing definitions, methods, etc. I don’t see any current trendlines towards conventional consensus either. If anything, the field seems to be getting larger and more fractured.

“So here’s my question: is there something-it-is-like to be that creature?”

This is the question that Nagel asked, but I think that it doesn’t quite hit the mark. There must be something it is like *for a conscious creature* to be that creature but, because each creature has a different history of experience, there is no way that one could possibly say what it is like for any *particular* conscious creature. The key question is “What is it like for *any creature* to be *conscious*?”. My answer to this question is that a creature is conscious if and only if the creature has a transparent brain representation of *something somewhere* in perspectival relation to its self. So there is nothing it is like for the living creature who does not have a “transparent brain representations of the world from a privileged egocentric perspective”.

Gary: “Suppose you designed a measuring instrument to look for egocentric brain representations and found no such things in this primitive creature. Can you thereby assume you have conclusively established the absence of there being something-it-is-like in that creature without presupposing your theory is true (which is what we are trying to use a measuring instrument to verify)?”

Does science *conclusively* establish the presence of any theoretical entity based on any measurement? I don’t think so. Science is a pragmatic enterprise that arrives at a provisional canon on the basis of the weight of current evidence. Also, I don’t see how one could even propose a measure of “something-it-is like” without a theoretical model to justify the measurement protocol. Failure to find what the theory says should be found counts against the validity of the theory. Finding what the theory predicts lends support to the theory. What else would you look for?

If we imagine ourselves traveling backwards through evolutionary time we will eventually find a living creature who does not have “transparent brain representations of the world from a privileged egocentric perspective”. So here’s my question: is there something-it-is-like to be that creature? If you say no, on what empirical evidence do you base that claim? Does something-it-is-likeness register on any measuring instruments such that we can detect its presence or absence in this brainless creature?

Suppose you designed a measuring instrument to look for egocentric brain representations and found no such things in this primitive creature. Can you thereby assume you have conclusively established the absence of there being something-it-is-like in that creature without presupposing your theory is true (which is what we are trying to use a measuring instrument to verify)? Because if your definition holds, this imagined creature does not have consciousness. But on what empirical grounds can you make this conclusion? What measuring instrument will you use to detect the presence or absence of consciousness to confirm your theory is right in saying there is not even a “wisp” of consciousness in these brainless creatures?

Cheers,

Gary

*Consciousness is a transparent brain representation of the world from a
privileged egocentric perspective*

The biophysical nature of this special kind of brain representation is realized in the neuronal structure and dynamics of what I call retinoid space. More details about this are given in my paper *Space, self, and the theater of consciousness*, here:

http://people.umass.edu/trehub/YCCOG828%20copy.pdf

You might also be interested in my reply to one who doubts the possibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness, in PhilPapers here:

http://philpapers.org/post/7771 Reply

“from the subjective point of view, as a transparent phenomenal representation of the world from a privileged egocentric perspective”

If so, then I have some follow-up questions:

How is “subjective” defined? How is “phenomenal” defined? How is “representation” defined?

It seems to me that vague and amorphous terms like “consciousness” can only be defined verbally in terms of other vague and amorphous terms like “awareness”, “experience”, or “subjective”, which are of course left undefined, or also defined verbally in an endless chain of open-ended definitions.